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ABSTRACT 
This article is an intrinsic case study of the bureaucratic elites in Singapore, specifically 
on the military elites’ post-retirement career patterns. Using original data, this article 
empirically illustrates that around half of the military elites transitioned to the public 
sector (and even more if government-linked corporations and entities are included). 
Through interviews with retired military elites, the transition process is detailed. Draw-
ing upon publicly available sources, this article suggests that this phenomenon can be 
attributed broadly into two categories: historical institutionalism and sociological rea-
sons. There is a lack of notional distinction between Singapore’s civilian leadership and 
military leadership, with the military seen as just another avenue to nurture public lead-
ers. Moreover, the notions of ‘scarcity of talent’ and the ‘universal applicability of talent’ 
are prevalent. It is under such an environment that many military elites continue their 
public service by other means after retirement. 
Keywords – bureaucratic elite formation, civil-military relations, historical institutional-
ism, meritocracy, Singapore Armed Forces 
INTRODUCTION 
Retired senior officers of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) play an outsized role in 
Singapore. Tatler Singapore features eight retired generals/admirals in its list of the 300 
“most powerful and influential people in Singapore” (Tatler 2020),1 in a country where 
all the generals/admirals combined make up less than 0.005 percent of the population. 
Many in the top echelons of the SAF retire relatively young, in their forties, and then 
transition to take on plum jobs in the public sector or government-linked corporations and 
entities (GLC/GLEs) – notwithstanding that they do not seem to have prior industry 
experience in the job. Prima facie, this seems to be an affront to a tenet of Singapore’s 
national identity – meritocracy – wherein individuals are to be recognised by their abilities 
and contributions, and not their social backgrounds, status, wealth or connections (Teo 
2019). In view of this phenomenon, some of the questions commonly raised include: are 
the generals really the best men for the job? Is there no one else qualified such that it 
always has to be another general? Is Singapore run by a military junta in all but name? 
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Moreover, even though retired military personnel are formally and legally civilians, their 
widespread transition into leadership roles into the public sectors have raised some 
eyebrows because a thinking exists that they are different from ‘true’ civilians. As Burke 
and Eaglen (2020) notes, retired military personnel “retain a military ethos, training, and 
sometimes mindset not shared by their colleagues who never served in the armed forces”. 
No doubt Singapore practices conscription, and most men are technically part of the 
military, conscript soldiers’ military experience consists of two years of full-time service, 
and maximally two weeks per year for the next ten years (to maintain operational 
readiness).2 This is experientially different from a career soldier who spends 20-30 years 
in the military. 
Observations about this military-to-civilian transition are not new (Chung 1991, Chua 
and Wang 1994, Au-Yong 2018). However, much about the military-civilian transition 
process remains unknown. This article thus seeks to uncover, firstly, to what extent are 
these general impressions true – how many of the SAF’s top echelons indeed transition 
to the public sector or GLC/GLEs; secondly, how the transition occurs; and thirdly, how 
this practice came about and why it has persisted. 
In studying the top echelons of the SAF, this article focuses on the rank of brigadier-
generals (BG) and above, and will collectively term generals and admirals as ‘military 
elites’. There is no standard definition to the term ‘military elites’; some include colonels 
while others restrict to major-generals (MG) and above. While there might not be 
substantive differences between a colonel and a brigadier-general that both retire after 
twenty years of active service, the decision to restrict the study to generals and admirals 
allows comparison with data in Chan (2019) on those ranked brigadier-general and above. 
Overall, this article can empirically confirm general impressions: around eighty percent 
of military elites transitioned to politics, the public sector, or GLC/GLEs in their first job 
post-retirement. As for the transition process, there are two categories – one which is 
planned by the government, and the other unplanned, although informal help is readily 
available. This phenomenon can be attributed to the fact that the military leadership was 
not perceived as distinct from the civilian leadership in the SAF’s formative years, 
thereby institutionalizing such a norm, and its persistence due to the notion of the ‘scarcity 
of talent’. Critics argue, however, that this phenomenon is a manifestation of a patronage 
system at work. The flow of the article is as follows: there will first be a discussion of 
how this research relates to existing literature, an explanation of the methodology, an 
exposition of empirical data on the military-civilian transition, a look at how and why all 
this came to be, and finally concludes with an assessment of the significance of these 
findings. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The broad contours of the conventional understanding of civil-military relations have 
been shaped by Samuel Huntington’s (1957) The Soldier and the State and Morris 
Janowitz’s (1960) The Professional Soldier, with Feaver (2003) judging Huntington’s 
theorization as the dominant theoretical paradigm, at least in political science scholarship. 
Huntington had argued for civilian mastery over a professional military – through 
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‘objective control’ – and that professionalized militaries should not be involved in 
politics. Janowitz, while criticizing Huntington’s professional ideal and opted for a more 
‘pragmatic professionalism’, also agreed that the military should not participate directly 
in politics. Both thus conceived of the military as a force exhibiting political neutrality 
and subordinating themselves to decisions of a legitimate state authority. Underlying such 
idealized standard of civil-military relations is the military’s distinctness from and 
subordination to the civilian leadership. Additionally, Finer ([1962] 2002, pp. 14-15) 
argued that militaries lack the “technical [ability] to administer any but the most primitive 
community” because “as societies become more complicated, … so the technical skills 
of the armed forces lag further and further behind them”. 
The influence of the above-mentioned major works means that conceptual attention by 
civil-military relations scholars has thus far mainly focused on the relationship between 
active military personnel and the civilians, and much less on retired military personnel 
vis-à-vis the society. Existing studies on retired military personnel have been pursued 
mostly by those studying leadership and human capital. Some American scholars have 
looked at the ethics of retired serviceman joining the defence industry and fuelling the 
“military-industrial complex” (Ulrich 2016; POGO 2018). Others have researched on the 
issues relating to the transition process of military to civilian employment (Reissman 
1956; Spiegel and Shultz 2003; Baruch and Quick 2007; Tūtlys, Winterton and 
Liesionienė 2018); the leadership skills veterans possess vis-à-vis civilians (Tiller 2007; 
Dexter 2016); and how military experience influence decision making in the civilian 
world, especially in the finance sector (Horowitz and Starn 2014; Benmelech and 
Frydman 2015; Kim, Oh and Park 2017; Guo, Zan, Sun and Zhang 2020). Only in recent 
years – perhaps due to President Trump’s initial enthusiasm for generals in his 
administration – have American civil-military relations scholars investigated the 
relationship between retired military personnel and civilian leadership from a more 
conceptual level (Friend 2020, Brooks and Friend 2020). 
The Israelis, given their militarized society (Kimmerling 1993), and following Janowitz’s 
sociological approach, do have a sizeable research output on the second careers of its 
retired military personnel (Mushkat 1981; Schechter 2001; Kalev 2006; Vigoda-Gadot, 
Baruch and Grimland 2010; Barak and Tsur 2012). More notable works regarding the 
permeation of retired military elites into Israeli society (Peri 2006, Sheffer and Barak 
2013) are nonetheless still preoccupied with the impact on security policies, à la 
mainstream conceptualization of civil-military relations.  
Beyond the perspective of civil-military relations, it is also possible to see military 
personnel as public servants and the military elites’ post-retirement careers as “informal, 
tangible rewards” offered to high public officials (Brans and Peters 2012, p. 4). In Japan, 
such practices are the norm, with elite bureaucrats retiring at fifty-five to either run for 
public office, join the private sector or semi-public organizations – not unlike Singapore 
(Nakamura and Dairokuno 2003). In fact, the practice of joining the private sector is so 
established that there is a term for it – amakaduri3 (Hood and Peters 2003). 
In the context of Singapore’s scholarship, military-civil transitions are mainly studied 
under the lens of civil-military relations and largely based on and developed from 
Huntington’s theorization. Singapore historian Tan Tai Yong (2011, p. 148) described the 
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civil-military relations terrain in Singapore as having “remained largely constant since 
the 1960s”, with an undisputed predominance of the civilians over the military. Early 
works on the officer corps’ entrance to the public sector include (Huxley 1993 and 2000), 
which pondered the impacts of increased military involvement in administrative and 
political roles, and whether the SAF would defend its corporate interests or expand its 
sphere of influence. Tan (2001, revisited 2011) also provided a different view to standard 
civil-military relations theory, in what he termed as “civil-military fusion”. According to 
him, the SAF was “deeply wedded to the state through thick structural links with the 
country’s political and administrative edifice … The military is not an independent or 
oppositional component outside the civilian polity, but forms an integral part of the 
administrative structure (Tan 2011, pp. 148-149). Walsh (2007, pp. 271-272) critiqued 
the fusion model as insufficient, arguing that the aristocratic model of political-military 
elite structure was more apt, because the “very narrow base for elite recruitment” resulted 
in “social linkages among those recruited”, and because “the frequent crossing of elites 
between the armed forces and politics or the civil service [led] to functional integration 
between military and political elites.” Nevertheless, despite their differences, the focus 
was still on traditional conceptions of civil-military relations, with Walsh concluding that 
the “social and functional integration results in a partial civilianization of the military and 
ensures stable and effective civil-military relations”. 
Of interesting note is that with Huntington’s work being the locus classicus about the 
notion of the military as a professional occupation, the SAF is placed in a delicate 
position. In trying to professionalize or project itself as a professional institution, the SAF 
has had to refer to Huntington’s work. But given that Huntington theorizes that a 
professional military is not involved in politics or the civilian leadership, there appears to 
be some disconnect from reality, since many military elites leave the SAF and 
immediately take up senior positions in the public sector. The SAF has thus far side-
stepped this issue, choosing not to engage with it. The textbook used for its professional 
military education (PME) includes a chapter on the “profession of arms” and it states: 
“[one] of the best accounts of the origins of the modern concept of the ‘military 
profession’ can be found in Huntington’s (1957) landmark study, The Soldier and the 
State.” (Chan, Soh and Ramaya 2011, p. 227)4 There was some discussion about “who is 
a military professional” but this was the furthest they went; there was no mention of 
Huntington’s ‘subjective’ or ‘objective control’. Neither was there any discussion relating 
to the SAF’s involvement in politics and the public sector in the seminars that followed 
the lectures.5 Therefore, it would seem that the SAF has not grappled with how to deal 
with this ‘issue’, to the extent that there is an ‘ideal’ standard of civil-military relations. 
This article is thus ground-breaking in Singapore’s civil-military relations scholarship. 
Instead of asking whether the transition of military elites to the state's civilian spheres 
will advance the military’s interest or reduce civilian control over it, it looks at the 
relationship between civilians and retired military personnel and the impact on society. 
From an empirical perspective, this article follows Reissman (1956) and Barak and Tsur 
(2012). This article can also be seen as a sequel to Chan (2019). While he covered the 
ins-and-outs of the military elite while they were in service, this article kickstarts an 
overview study of life after military service. Additionally, this study is opportune as thirty 
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years’ worth of relevant data between 1990-2020 is now available, something unavailable 
to Chan (1985), Huxley (1993; 2000), da Cunha (1999), Tan (2001), and Walsh (2007) 
when they first commented on the phenomenon.6   
METHODOLOGY 
This article undertakes a “mixed methods” research approach, whereby inferences were 
drawn using both quantitative and qualitative approaches in a single study (Tashakkori & 
Creswell 2007). This is because practicalities of the research were such that it could not 
be “driven by theory or data exclusively” and “a process of abduction” enables one to 
“move back and forth between induction and deduction through a process of inquiry. 
(Doyle, Brady and Bryne 2009, p. 178)” Among the typologies of mixed methods 
research, this article’s research design falls under “follow-up explanatory”, where 
quantitative findings are first identified before qualitative methods are employed to 
explain or enhance the quantitative results (ibid). 
Quantitative research 
The quantitative research sought to establish where retired military elites transitioned to 
as their first post-retirement job, and where the population of retired military elites were 
working as a whole across time periods. The dataset consisted of a list of all the military 
personnel who have ever held a general rank7 in Singapore from its independence in 1965 
to 2018 – 169 men and one woman – and the jobs and other appointments they took on. 
Initial reference was drawn from Chan (2019, p. 13),8 with further confirmation and 
updates sought from newspaper reports, news releases, companies’ annual reports and 
updates to the stock exchange. As of May 2020, 147 of the aforementioned 170 
individuals could be ascertained to have retired from active service, eighteen still in 
service or holding to an active rank, and the status of five unknown. 
The organisations that the military elites were involved in were compiled, categorised 
into five sectors and then enumerated:  
1. Private sector 
2. Politics 
3. Public sector 
4. GLC/GLE 
5. People sector  
[See appendix for explainer of the sectors and annex for list of organizations] 
To some extent, there was a risk of biased sampling, as open-sourced research meant a 
dependence on information available in the public domain, and those who transitioned 
into the public sector and listed companies were more likely to surface up than those who 
entered the private sector. However, given that the status of most of the retired military 
elite is known (145 out of 147), the extent of sampling bias occurring is minimal. 
Although information is scant for some, at least one of their post-retirement jobs is known 
and this was still a reference point for broader data interpretation and analysis.  
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Of note is the need to distinguish between the number of military elites (147) and number 
of job positions in the dataset (143) because some held concurrent appointments. 
Moreover, there was a case of a general who held two ‘first job post-retirement’.9 When 
he took up an appointment in Company A in the year he retired, it so happened that 
Company A purchased Company B and the general went on to head Company B. This 
would have generated two job positions that made up the 143 job positions because 
calculations were reckoned in years; they were unable to capture differences in months 
and dates. Therefore, the empirical results only approximate the post-retirement job 
transition and not categorically ‘how many retired military elites went where’. 
Qualitative research 
To understand the military-civilian transition and to gain first-person perspectives on the 
transition, interviews were conducted. There were three interviewees, the first one who is 
a known contact, the second was referred by the former, and the last solicited via 
LinkedIn. They have been pseudonymised and their details are as follow: 
 
S/N Pseudonym Vocation Rank Sector for first job post-
retirement 
1 Albert Air Force Brigadier-general Public 
2 Bryan Navy Rear Admiral Public 
3 Calvin Army Brigadier-general Government-linked Corporation 
 
Although this interviewee sample is very small, the ways they framed their responses 
were similar – there was also a retired Rear Admiral who did not accept the interview 
request but shared some of his thoughts in written form and his response was similar – 
and so to a certain extent response saturation has been achieved. Moreover, in a “follow-
up explanatory” research design model, the quantitative phase has the priority (Doyle et. 
al. 2009).  
The interviews were semi-structured in nature. A set of questions were prepared and sent 
to the interviewees in advance for them to understand the inquiry and to form their 
thoughts. The interviews were free flowing in that a question was posed to kickstart the 
interview and follow-up questions posed depending on the response. As the author had 
military experience, he was familiar with the military context and jargon, and was thus 
able to achieve a certain level of familiarity with the interviewees – although not to the 
extent that the interviews were so informal as to affect how they shared their experiences 
close (given rank difference). Information gleaned from the interviews was synthesized 
and supplemented with information available from primary and secondary resources to 
develop an exposition of the ‘transition process’, and the thinking behind such a 
phenomenon. Primary resources included newspaper articles and press releases, which 
articulated the government’s public stance and rhetoric, while secondary resources 
include studies others have done related to this military-civil transition. 
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CLEARING THE FOG: WHERE RETIRED MILITARY ELITES 
TRANSITIONED TO 
The following section discusses the findings from the analyses on the tabulated list of 
retired military elites.  
Q1. How old were the military elites when they retired? 


























Age 39.3 44.3 45.6 45.6 45.5 46.9 47.0 45.7 
 
It is common knowledge that the military elites retire from active service at a relatively 
young age compared to the rest of the society but empirical data on it has thus far not 
been publicly available. Between 1991-2020, the changes in average retirement age have 
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Q2. Where did retired military elites transitioned to? Did they congregate in any sector? 
Figure 2: Overall first job position post-retirement 
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Figure 3: First job position post-retirement, by time period 
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Around sixty percent of all retired military elites carried on with some form of public 
service (politics or the public sector) in their first job post-retirement (Figure 2). Breaking 
down the data into time periods, consistently more than half of every period’s retiring 
military elites transitioned into the public sector after 1990 (Figure 3). This differs from 
existing literature; The Straits Times – Singapore’s major English newspaper – reported 
in 2018:  
A bigger proportion of [one-star generals] head to the private sector than the 
public sector, say observers. They estimate that about 30 to 40 percent stay in 
public service. A [Ministry of Defence (Mindef)] survey last year found that about 
34 percent of all retired officers – military commanders who have completed 
Officer Cadet School – joined the private sector upon retirement (Au-Yong 2018). 
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the early years of implementation, retiring SAF generals were eased into second 
careers as heads of statutory boards and government-linked companies. This was 
changed after 1997 when compensation packages were revised in the SAF. ... This 
revision probably came about due to difficulties in emplacing retired generals and 
the mixed results of those actually emplaced (p. 375). 
Empirical data does not substantiate this; there is neither a discernible trend nor any 
significant reduction of retired military elites joining the public sector. The discrepancy 
with The Straits Times could be due to different criteria in categorizing what constituted 
the ‘public sector’, ‘public service’ and ‘private sector’, as GLCs are sometimes classified 
as part of the private sector (Koh 2015). Consequently, this highlights the value of this 
quantitative section, which provides traceable data that can inform future research.  
Q3. What is the distribution of the whole population of retired military elites across 
sectors over the years?  
Figure 4: Number of job positions filled by retired military elites in each sector, over 
5-year time periods 
 
 
People change jobs over time, but to what extent do retired military elites stay in the 
public sector? Another way to look at the data is to look at what the distribution of job 
positions is across the five sectors over a given period of years. Figure 4 illustrates the 












1970-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 2011-2015 2016-2020
Private Politics Public GLC/GLE People
Year 
Sector 
1970-1990 1991-1995 1995-2000 2001-2005 2005-2010 2011-2015 2016-2020 
Private 0 2 (7.1%) 9 (17.3%) 12 (15.8%) 11 (10.4%) 32 (19.6%) 36 (20.8%) 
Politics 2 (28.6%) 3 (10.7%) 3 (5.8%) 3 (3.9%) 4 (3.8%) 7 (4.3%) 5 (2.9%) 
Public 4 (57.1%) 14 (50%) 25 (48.1%) 39 (51.3%) 55 (51.9%) 73 (44.8%) 83 (48%) 
GLC/GLE 1 (14.3%) 9 (32.1%) 15 (28.8%) 21 (27.6%) 34 (32.1%) 50 (30.7%) 49 (28.3%) 
People 0 0 0 1 (1.3%) 2 (1.9%) 1 (0.6%) 0 
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is treated as a single population; every job within that dataset is counted. For instance, 
fifty percent of the twenty-eight job positions were public sector jobs between the years 
1991-1995, and forty-eight percent of the 173 job positions were public sector jobs 
between the period 2016-2020. Overall, between 1970-2020, around half undertook roles 
in the public sector. 
These figures thus firstly confirm general impressions that many retired military elites do 
transition into politics/public sector and if not, under the umbrella of GLC/GLEs. Only a 
small number make a ‘clean break’ to venture into the private sector. Secondly, even as 
people changed jobs, the bulk of the retired military elites remained in the public sector 
or GLC/GLEs. 
Q4. Where in the public sector did the retired military elites go as their first job post-
retirement? Did they congregate in any ministry? 
























Abbreviation:                           
MOE: Ministry of 
Education   
MND: Ministry of National 
Development     
MCI: Ministry of Communications and 
Information 
MTI: Ministry of Trade and 
Industry MEWR: Ministry of Environment and Water Resources MHA: Ministry of Home Affairs   
MOT: Ministry of 
Transport   
MOM: Ministry of 
Manpower       
MINLAW: Ministry of 
Law     
MINDEF: Ministry of 
Defence   
PMO: Prime Minister's 
Office       MOF: Ministry of Finance     
MOH: Ministry of Health   
MCCY: Ministry of Culture, Community and 
Youth   MFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs   
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Figure 6: First job position in the public sector, by ministry, by time period 
 
 
Proceeding from Q2, Q4 looks specifically at the public sector. The different public 
agencies and subsidiaries have been subsumed under their parent ministry for ease of 
analysis (See Appendix for list of organizations). They illustrate the distribution of the 
first jobs in the public sector as a whole (Figure 5), and across five-year periods (Figure 
6). Between 1970-2020, Mindef took up twenty-eight percent of the 82 public sector job 
positions in the dataset. Also, over the past twenty years, 2001-2020, Mindef, MOE, and 
MTI consistently recruited retired military elites every year; other ministries’ intakes 
were more varied. Among all the ministries, none has gone to the Ministry of Social and 













1970-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 2011-2015 2016-2020
MOE MTI MOT MINDEF MOH MND MEWR MOM
PMO MCCY MCI MHA MINLAW MOF MFA
            Ministry         
Year 
MOE MTI MOT MINDEF MOH MND MEWR MOM PMO MCCY MCI MHA MINLAW MOF MFA 
1970-1990 1         1 1         1       
1991-1995     1 2         1           2 
1996-2000 2   3 4         2           1 
2001-2005 2 1 3 1               1 1   1 
2006-2010 1 2 1 4 4   1     1 2   1     
2011-2015 1 2   9     1 2   1     1 1   
2016-2020 2 1   3 1       2 2 3 1       
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Q5. What is the distribution of the retired military elites in the public sector over the 
years?  
Figure 7: Number of job positions filled by retired military elites in the public sector, 
by ministry, over 5-year time periods 
 
 
Q5 follows Q3’s approach. Figure 7 illustrates the distribution of job positions in the 
public sector over every five-year period, thereby approximating the distribution of the 
retired military elites within the public sector. Between 1991-2020, around 20-30 percent 
of the public-sector jobs are from Mindef, and those from MOE and MTI have been quite 
considerable too. The proportion of job positions from MOT and MFA has dropped 
steadily over the years such that they are no longer distinct from other ministries. 
Therefore, retired military elites who transition to the public sector are more likely to be 
working in Mindef, MOE or MTI. 
  
           Ministry     
Year
MOE MTI MOT MINDEF MOH MND MEWR MOM PMO MCCY MCI MHA MINLAW MOF MFA
1991-1995 2 (14.3%) 4 (28.6%) 1 (7.1%) 1 (7.1%) 1 (7.1%) 1 (7.1%) 1 (7.1%) 3 (21.4%)
1996-2000 3 (12%) 1 (4%) 3 (12%) 6 (24%) 1 (4%) 3 (12%) 1 (4%) 2 (8%) 5 (20%)
2001-2005 4 (10.8%) 3 (8.1%) 10 (27%) 7 (18.9%) 2 (5.4%) 2 (5.4%) 1 (2.7%) 1 (2.7%) 2 (5.4%) 5 (13.5%)
2006-2010 5 (9.1%) 7 (12.7%) 7 (12.7%) 12 (21.8%) 4 (7.3%) 1 (1.8%) 4 (7.3%) 1 (1.8%) 3 (5.5%) 2 (3.6%) 1 (1.8%) 2 (3.6%) 6 (10.9%)
2011-2015 6 (8.2%) 9 (12.3%) 4 (5.5%) 20 (27.4%) 3 (4.1%) 1 (1.4%) 7 (9.6%) 4 (5.5%) 2 (2.7%) 5 (6.8%) 4 (5.5%) 2 (2.7%) 1 (1.4%) 5 (6.8%)
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MOE MTI MOT MINDEF MOH MND MEWR MOM
PMO MCCY MCI MHA MINLAW MOF MFA
Ng, Paul Seen 
 
International Public Management Review   Vol. 21, Iss. 1, 2021 
www.ipmr.net  53 IPMR
Q6. Where in the GLC/GLE sector did the retired military elites go as their first job post-
retirement? Did they congregate in any company? 
Table 1: Overall first job position in GLC/GLE 
S/N Name of GLC/GLE 
Number of job 
positions 
Percentage (100%) 
1 ST Engineering Group 17 43.6% 
2 SIA 4 10.3% 
3 Temasek Holdings 3 7.7% 
4 NTUC  3 7.7% 
5 DBS 2 5.1% 
6 SATS 2 5.1% 
7 Sembcorp Industries 2 5.1% 
8 Certis Cisco 1 2.6% 
9 JTC Corp 1 2.6% 
10 Pavilion Capital 1 2.6% 
11 Singapore Power Group 1 2.6% 
12 SMRT Corp 1 2.6% 
13 Surbana Jurong Defence Services 1 2.6% 
 
Proceeding from Q2, Q6 looks specifically at the GLC/GLEs. As some of these 
GLC/GLEs have many subsidiaries, they have been subsumed under the main GLC/GLE 
for ease of analysis (Table 1). Between 1970-2020, 43.6 percent of GLC/GLE job 
positions belonged to ST Engineering Group, a defense company. This suggests that of 
those that joined GLC/GLEs, around two-fifths returned to something familiar in their 
first job post-retirement. 
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Q7. What is the distribution of the retired military elites in the GLC/GLE sector over the 
years?  
Figure 8: Number of job positions filled by retired military elites in GLC/GLE, over 5-
year time periods 
 
           Company        
Year 
ST Engineering Others 
1991-1995 22.2% 77.8% 
1996-2000 53.3% 46.7% 
2001-2005 42.9% 57.1% 
2006-2010 29.4% 70.6% 
2011-2015 32.0% 68.0% 
2016-2020 38.0% 62.0% 
 
Q7 follows Q5 and Q3’s approach. Figure 8 illustrates the distribution of GLC/GLE-
sector job positions over every five-year period, from 1991-2020. ST Engineering 
Group’s proportion ranged between 22.2 percent (1991-1995) to 53.3 percent (1996-
2000). There is no discernible trend in this distribution, but it can be concluded that 
between 1996-2020, at least around one in three of those who transitioned to the 
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THE TRANSITION PROCESS 
Having empirically established where retired military elites transitioned to, this section 
discusses how they transition. Interviews reveal that not all military elites – even of the 
same rank – are equal. There are two categories: those that were absorbed into the 
Administrative Service as Administrative Officers (AOs) and those that were not. One of 
the interviewees was an AO. 
The Administrative Service is a legacy from the colonial period, and it is the apex of 
public service leadership in Singapore, forming less than half a percent of total manpower 
strength (Neo and Chen 2007). Most permanent secretaries and chief executives of 
statutory boards are AOs (Low 2016) and in their various jobs, AOs “exercise high-level 
leadership responsibilities, remain largely concerned with policymaking, economic 
forecasting, project planning, and managing staff and procurements (Jones 2002, p. 74).” 
In 1995, military personnel made up ten percent of Administrative Service staff (Barr and 
Skrbiš 2008); this increased to 17.8 percent by 2007 (Ho 2008).  
For this group of military AOs, their time in the SAF, to quote RADM Bryan, is “a 
secondment”, or “on loan”. The government’s career plans for them have always included 
the post-military component and the time in the military is to be seen as an appointment 
akin to any other civilian AO’s career path in the public service. The SAF is simply 
another avenue for personnel development. Just like how their civilian counterparts are 
deployed across ministries and statutory boards, this group of retired military elites do 
not look for a new job when they retire from the military. Deployment is managed by the 
Public Service Division; they coordinate the “deployment of AOs to key posts in 
ministries and statutory boards, ensuring that all had proper career paths and that key 
posts were filled with suitably qualified officers (Neo and Chen 2007, p. 329).”  
While one could say that there is a guaranteed job for these retired military elites, from 
the government’s perspective, it might be better to characterize the situation as ‘one 
career, two segments’. The public service career for this group of military personnel is 
intended to go beyond the typical twenty-odd years of other career soldiers, potentially 
lasting until the statutory retirement age (sixty-two years old), and with a civilian segment 
conceived right from the start. Or to quote Walsh (2007, p. 283), this is a manifestation 
of “civil service in uniform”.  
This planned career transition – if one wants to see a military career and public sector 
career as dichotomous for this group of military elites – is not commonly known. 
Although the existence of a ‘dual-career scheme’10 is public knowledge, it is perceived 
as referring to secondments to the ministries during one’s active service days. This is 
evidenced by the media’s reporting of the appointment of then-MG Melvyn Ong as CDF 
in 2018: “From 2013 to 2014, through a dual-career scheme, MG Ong served as Deputy 
CEO of the Early Childhood Development Agency” [emphasis added] (CNA 2018). 
Otherwise, the government only alludes to the planned career roadmap. For instance, in 
a 2001 press release, Mindef noted that: “The training and development provided to these 
scholars … ensure that they are well-equipped and capable in assuming key positions in 
the Administrative Service, other civil service sector or even the private sector. [emphasis 
added]” Of course, military AOs have the liberty to not transition into the public sector 
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when they retire from the military. For those who continue, BG Calvin shared that this 
group of soldiers are “committed to serve” even though they might have other job offers 
waiting for them; their “values tell them … for all the benefits as an Admin Service” – 
which included “exposure” and not just monetary benefits – they would not “use those 
benefits of exposure and then go and find another job.” 
Many military elites are not AOs and they do not actually have jobs planned out for them. 
In principle, they need to make their own post-retirement plans. What accounts for the 
large number of transitions into the public and GLC/GLE sectors then? BG Calvin 
characterizes the situation as a ‘demand and supply’ issue. Demand comes from both the 
public and private sector – there are always job vacancies. The public sector and 
GLC/GLEs’ demand for retiring military elites is perennial, because firstly, many job 
positions are limited to Singapore citizens. Secondly, the generals produced by the SAF 
are deemed to be of a certain caliber – antithetical to this notion is to doubt the quality of 
the SAF’s leadership. In BG Albert’s words, generals are a “known quantity” with a 
“track record” – organizations, especially those in the public sector, are thus happy to hire 
them. BG Albert further shared that he did not look for a job – he received an unsolicited 
call with a job offer. BG Calvin also attributed the demand for retired military elites to a 
“mental model” that existed in some firms, especially defense companies, where because 
a position was historically filled by a general, they instinctively look for another general 
to take over the position – although he was quick to point out that this was not a uniquely 
Singaporean phenomenon.   
Public sector organizations and GLC/GLEs will come to know about military elites who 
are retiring soon because the network among all these organizations at the leadership level 
is closely knit – BG Calvin uses the term “old boys’ network”, with many people knowing 
one another on a “first-name” basis. News of impending retirement spreads and 
recommendations are made through word of mouth. BG Albert surmised that he got his 
call from Organization A because his then-superior was ‘chatting’ with the permanent 
secretary of Organization A, who was asking if anyone was leaving the military, upon 
which BG Albert’s superior floated his name. 
From the perspective of the retiring officers, the ‘supply’ side, given that non-AO military 
elites have no obligations in the public sector, where they went depended on their personal 
inclinations. BG Calvin was sure that he did not want to transition into the public sector 
– even though he had offers – as he wanted to test his leadership skills in the private 
sector. Others, on the other hand, were happy to continue contributing in the public sector. 
There are also practical considerations: BG Ishak, in comments made in The Straits 
Times, said that “the military retirement age which, at fifty, is young enough to keep them 
working but which makes switching to a career heavy on domain knowledge tough (Au-
Yong 2018).” A reason given in the same news article for why many retired military elites 
joined GLCs was that it was a matter of proportion: more than a third of the top thirty 
listed companies are owned by Temasek Holdings, with the rest being family-run or 
headquartered elsewhere. 
Overall, these interviews highlight that for the non-AO military elites, the hiring process 
is fair. First, there was a job vacancy; then the hiring organization deemed being a leader 
in the SAF as representative of one’s capabilities (and hence meritocracy was pursued); 
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finally, the retiring military elite had the opportunity to engage with the hiring 
organization, and because both parties were satisfied with one another, the job offer was 
accepted. There was no overt or clear case of patronage at work; the questions which arise 
are how wide the public sector and GLC/GLEs do look when they are searching to fill 
their job vacancies, and to what extent their faith in a military elite is warranted. For the 
AO military elites, there is a lesser debate in the sense that their career transition is only 
what it was intended to be. If anything, it is the underlying assumptions behind the career 
construct of having two segments in one career that need to be tested. Having explored 
how the transition process took place, this article now turns its attention to explaining 
how and why the practice came to be. 
THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF NON-DISTINCTION BETWEEN MILITARY 
AND CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP 
The above exemplifies what Tan (2001; 2011) has termed as “civil-military fusion”: the 
military is not perceived as a separate institution per se, vis-à-vis the public service. If 
anything, the major difference is that military personnel are uniformed while civilians are 
not. Consequently, for those still interested in the public sector after retirement and their 
recruiters, transition is merely a matter of ‘skin shedding’, and a case of ‘continuation of 
public service by other means’ and nothing extraordinary – it is cognitively easy to accept. 
It could be said that such practices are accepted as the norm and part of organizational 
culture. How did this seemingly naturally occurring phenomenon come to be? While it 
has already been noted (e.g. Tan 2011) that the military in Singapore was a creation of 
the post-colonial state and played no role in precipitating independence like in 
neighboring Indonesia or Vietnam, and hence does not have its own power base or 
military and martial tradition, it does not explain how the leadership fusion or integration 
came to be.  
A possible explanation is that Singapore’s early political leadership did not see the 
military leadership as separate from them civilians but as one, and subsequently such 
notions became normalized. As Rebecca Schiff’s ([1995] 2008, p. 44) concordance theory 
proposed, “particular cultural and historical conditions … will determine whether 
relations among the military, the government, and the society take the form of separation, 
integration, or some other alternative.” This postulation is supported by the fact that the 
civilian leadership offered themselves to be leaders of the nascent SAF. Both President 
Yusof Ishak and the first defense minister, Dr Goh Keng Swee have been pictured 
appearing and inspecting parades in military uniform, complete with rank – President 
Yusof Ishak at National Day parades between 1966-1968, and Goh on at least two 
occasions in 1966. While it has not yet been possible to find out the circumstances in 
which President Yusof Ishak wore the uniform, Goh’s biographer, Tan Siok Sun, shared 
that Goh “recognized the need for a soldier to lead the army, hence he donned the uniform 
to indicate he was ‘one of them’.” He only stopped wearing his uniform when he found 
“a true soldier” – referring to Lieutenant General (LG) Winston Choo, Singapore’s first 
Chief of Defence Force (CDF) (personal communication, 2020). Therefore, at the very 
least, Goh had no compunction in blurring the lines between civilian and military 
Continuation of Public Services by other Means: The Post-military Careers of Singapore’s Military Elites 
 
International Public Management Review  Vol. 21, Iss. 1, 2021 
www.ipmr.net  58 IPMR
leadership and was not fastidious about the civil-military division.11 Moreover, a handful 
of AOs were selected by Goh for secondment over to the SAF, with two of them, Kirpa 
Ram Vij and Tan Chin Tiong making BG. For them, their transition to the public service 
was less of a crossover than a return to where they originated.    
Chan (2019, p. 192) also noted that the “civilian leadership has held such primacy over 
the military that they effectively ran the SAF for a good number of years”, so much so 
that the “danger of decisions being taken without professional [military] inputs” existed. 
A British High Commission memo in 1974 reported that the SAF was “dominated” by 
“Dr Goh and civilian officials” to the extent that it afforded the SAF “little chance to 
develop an officer cadre or truly professional expertise. (ibid)” Therefore, as can be seen, 
the civilian leadership exercised much direct control in the early days of the SAF’s 
development and in this sense the division between civilian and military was even slighter 
than ever. Given the absence of a military tradition in Singapore, from a “historical 
institutionalism” perspective (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007), this would be the “critical 
juncture” which formed the schema in which military leaders are not seen as distinct and 
are accepted by their civilian counterparts. Consequently, when the first cohort of 
generals that rose through the ranks retired and joined the public sector – and aided by 
the precedent of earlier AOs returning to public service – it was accepted as part of the 
norm.  
THE SOCIOLOGICAL REASONS FOR THE PUBLIC SECTOR’S CONTINUED 
WIDESPREAD EMPLOYMENT OF RETIRED MILITARY ELITES 
This article argues that underlying the phenomenon is the notion of the “scarcity of talent” 
in Singapore (Tan 2008), and associated with it, the “universal applicability of talent” to 
any situation (Barr 2006). These notions have been expressed by Lee Kuan Yew, the 
founding Prime Minister of Singapore, and whose influence and legacy cast a long 
shadow. Lee had concluded that all societies displayed signs of what he termed as a 
“population diamond” – at the top were those with high levels of IQ and competence; the 
center was the majority, with average intellect and abilities; at the bottom, abilities tapered 
off. Because of this, the most important jobs in society had to be drawn from the group at 
the top; they were the yeast that would leaven the whole society (Han, Fernandez and Tan 
1998). 
Back in 1966, in a meeting with school principals, Lee likened society to be an army 
battalion – where there are “sixty to seventy officers, one to two hundred sergeants and 
corporals, and the others, about 500, are privates.” “It must be. This is life,” he remarked. 
In another speech in 1971, Lee claimed that the “main burden of present planning and 
implementation rests on the shoulders of some 300 key persons. … Together they are a 
closely knit and coordinated hard core. If all the 300 were to crash in one Jumbo jet, then 
Singapore will disintegrate. That shows how small the base is for our leadership in 
politics, economics and security.” Such views of “talent scarcity” are held by the present 
government too, with Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong articulating something similar in 
2008 at an SAF Scholarship ceremony. He talked about how opportunities elsewhere 
were lucrative and hence the SAF had to present a compelling career proposition to 
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continually attract talent. It was couched in terms of a zero-sum game where another 
organization’s gain was the SAF’s loss. One could see how talent – according to their 
definitions – was greatly cherished.  
Given the view that there is a fixed amount of talent in Singapore, it only made sense for 
the top leaders of the SAF – especially the military AOs – to transition to politics, the 
public sector, and GLC/GLEs. This was especially so when the SAF was viewed to have 
established “a near monopoly [on] the country’s top academic achievers (Tan 2011, p. 
161).” Then-Defense Minister Dr Yeo Ning Hong mentioned in 1991 that Mindef had a 
sizeable share of the national talent and that they wanted to share with the rest of the 
country. As da Cunha (1999, p. 469), argued in a sociological study of the SAF, “scholar-
officers are viewed, [as] not just an SAF resource [but] rather a national one, possessing 
skills and talents that go beyond the purely military.” It thus made no sense for the state 
to invest so much in developing the top echelons of the SAF, only for them to retire from 
public service, enter the private sector, and ‘leak’ out of the state.  
Associated with the notion of the scarcity of talent and the belief that the SAF has 
attracted a large share of the talent pool, was the notion that talent – and especially the 
SAF’s – was universally competent. It was the idea of “generalist leadership”, where one 
was able to “manage anything they [turned] their hand to (Gosling, Jones & Sutherland 
2012, p. 81).” The logic flowed as such: because every society only had a limited quantity 
of talent, then naturally every industry’s leaders would be drawn from the same pool of 
talent. As the SAF was perceived to possess a large pool of Singapore’s talent, it was 
expected that they would be able to overcome any unfamiliarity with the industry and 
discharge their roles well.  
There was also much confidence in the training and development offered by the SAF in 
making its military elites versatile. In fact, military officers in Singapore are seen to 
“possess higher levels of organizational ability, self-discipline and leadership skills than 
others. (Aljunied 2020, p. 348)” Dr Yeo had expressed in 1991 that SAF officers’ 
“vigorous training, their wide-spectrum experience and exposure, and most valuable of 
all, their leadership in the SAF and MINDEF stand them in good stead.” Former top civil 
servant Lim Jit Poh said it most clearly: “Retired senior military personnel have been 
drilled in discipline and responsibility and have certain skill sets. At the end of the day, it 
is about talent. It doesn't matter where they came from but whether they can contribute… 
(Lee 2020)” 
An allusion to this generalist leadership concept could also be seen by how PM Lee Hsien 
Loong explained his choice of appointing former Chief of Navy and former CEO of the 
Housing and Development Board, RADM Lui Tuck Yew, to a junior ministerial role after 
the 2006 elections: “If I put Lui Tuck Yew back in [Ministry of National Development] 
because he used to be in Housing Board or I put him back in Defense because he used to 
be in the navy, well, I may or may not be stretching him. I put him in Education, it is a 
new area, let us see. (Li 2006)” Implicit in this was the expectation that even if deployed 
in a totally foreign environment, the talents from the SAF would have no problem 
mastering it in time and becoming effective leaders, thereby exhibiting this belief in the 
‘universal applicability of talent’. 
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Having established why the government sees it fit to absorb military personnel into the 
Administrative Service and have them transition into the higher echelons of the public 
sector post-retirement, one might question why the SAF even set its mandatory retirement 
age at relatively a young age.12 This contrasts with the average age in which a British 
Chief of the Defence Staff relinquished appointment – 60.5 years old – or that of the 
American Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs – 61.6 years old. Could the government 
not have designed a forty-year career scheme whereby its military elites retired in their 
sixties, such that they continue contributing to the SAF (and by extension, the country) – 
thereby stemming any ‘wastage’?  
A reason offered by the second CDF (1992-1995), LG Ng Jui Ping, who was a ‘leading 
architect’ in designing the career scheme, was that it was better to have young generals 
to be in charge: “If there was a war, what would be the ages you want your generals to be 
when fighting a war? If you are serious about winning a war, you do not want 65-year-
old and 75-year-old generals leading the show. So it was decided that no officer in the 
SAF shall be more than 50 years old. (Lim and Vijayan 2020)” Walsh (2007, p. 267) 
echoed this, noting that the SAF was purposely kept young to renew the “energy and 
focus of military personnel.”  
More pertinent to this article’s discussion is that this is designed to attract and retain the 
SAF’s best talent – especially those earmarked to be absorbed into the Administrative 
Service. The logic was that top-tier talents were more likely to stay in the military if they 
felt that the top brass positions were in sight for them and that they would reach the 
general grade. Ng illustrated with a hypothetical case of someone aged thirty-five 
assessing his career options: if the “guy up there (the top brass) [was] only forty-eight”, 
and if they were “all going to retire at sixty-five or seventy”, then the person would assess 
that he would “be stuck here for twenty years”. It was thought that if he was confident of 
his own talent and value to organizations, he would leave for more lucrative openings and 
not wait for that twenty years. Ng further reasoned that such a brain drain would not only 
be limited to one person, but the whole cohort of top talents, so much so that “if we have 
a system where the top tier invariably will leave, you have condemned the organization 
to always have leaders who are second or third best. And then this idea that the SAF will 
always nurture and draw in top talent will begin to dilute. (Lim and Vijayan 2020)” 
Indeed, the SAF was perceived to lack ‘top quality’ men in its earlier days. It was through 
much effort in narrative and mindset shaping that the government was able to attract more 
of those whom they deemed as high-quality men into the SAF. Lee Kuan Yew had shared 
in 1981 that 19.6 percent of the senior SAF officers were graduates, which paled in 
comparison to the Administrative Service (97.9 percent), the Public Utilities Board (100 
percent), and Singapore Airlines (seventy-seven percent). He remarked that “The SAF is 
in charge of the most crucial of all our problems. It was totally unacceptable that the 
quality of senior SAF officers should be inferior to that of the Administrative Service, 
EDB, JTC, DBS, TAS or PUB.13 Quite the contrary, the senior officers of the SAF must 
be distinctly superior.”  
Consequently, given all these, one can surmise that there was a great emphasis on talent 
and quality; all the different considerations were interrelated. Because of the notions of 
scarcity of talent, and the universal applicability of talent and leadership capabilities, the 
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SAF’s top talents were absorbed into the Administrative Service so that they could 
transition to the public sector, thereby allowing the best part of Singapore’s human capital 
to be shared. However, the SAF was itself deemed to be lacking talents and as defense 
was a national priority – Singapore was a small and vulnerable city-state – it was thought 
that Singapore could not “afford to have its best minds in medicine and engineering, and 
the second best in the SAF” (Lee 1981). The SAF thus sought to offer an attractive career 
proposition to attract talents by undercutting its ‘competitors’. This manifested in the 
form of keeping retirement age low, so that the climb to the top brass was in sight right 
from the start.  
The above reasoning regarding talent is further supported by the People’s Action Party’s 
(PAP) – Singapore’s ruling party since 1959 – consistent explanation when inducting 
retired military elites into politics: an almost sole focus on their competence, intellect, 
and leadership capabilities. For instance, in 1988 when BG George Yeo became the 
second military elite (after Lee Hsien Loong) to don party colors and participate in 
elections, Lee Kuan Yew’s endorsement for Yeo was that he was “a good thinker and a 
candid man”. Moreover, Yeo had been persuaded to enter politics because of his 
“perceptiveness” (The Business Times 1988). Twenty-seven years later in the 2015 
general elections, LG Ng Chee Meng also resigned from the SAF to enter politics. In his 
introductory video, his shared that he brought “in a level of organizational abilities’ and 
had the experience of ‘running a big organization that is as complex and wide ranging”. 
Over the past forty years, seven retired military elites have entered politics; these two 
examples covering the earlier period and the latest suffice in illustrating the narrative that 
the PAP sought to impress upon voters. They also illuminate what the ruling party values 
about military elites, thus strengthening the explanation regarding the notions of talent 
scarcity.  
In doing so, what is not a reason for the permeation of the military elite in Singapore’s 
higher echelons – at least based on publicly available discourse – is highlighted. In trying 
to explain the state of Israel’s civil-security relations, Sheffer and Barak’s (2013) Israel’s 
Security Networks: A Theoretical and Comparative Perspective plotted out the existence 
of an “informal powerful security network” that had an “exceptional ability to influence 
many aspects of public life in Israel”, from domestic to external policymaking, and from 
strategic to tactical policies (pp. 1-2). The network was made up of serving and former 
security personnel and their partners in the state’s various civilian spheres. Its emergence 
was attributed to the numerous Arab-Israeli confrontations that created real and imagined 
existential threats to Israel, thereby creating the space for the military and security 
personnel to enter the public domain and exert influence on war-making and foreign and 
security policies. Although Israel’s Security Networks argued that the security network 
has had significant domestic impact – including the cultural, political, societal and the 
economical spheres – truly the focus was on the cycle of how security concerns provided 
the conditions for the emergence of the security network, how members of the network 
shaped security issues, which impacted the security context Israel found itself in, and 
which perpetuated the security actors’ dominance in Israeli society. Focus thus centered 
on the security domain.  
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As part of Israeli’s Security Networks’ comparative study, Sheffer and Barak tried to fit 
their theorization of the emergence of the security network onto Singapore: that the 
increasing involvement of SAF officers in Singapore’s political system and the 
assumption of a “significant degree of influence over governmental decision making in a 
wide variety of spheres” was a response to the “perceived and actual continuous 
existential threats that it faced (pp. 140-141).” No doubt the “unique position of the 
military and the security sector in Singapore’s affairs” can be attributed to the historical 
context of Singapore’s independence and its geographic location (p. 139),14 the security 
aspect has not played up that much in Singapore’s public discourse when it comes to 
accounting for the permeation of Singapore’s military elites in the wider society. Whereas 
Israeli civilian leaders with modest backgrounds in the security sector had “attempted to 
present themselves as security experts” so as to bolster their credentials (p. 76), entry into 
politics in Singapore has thus far not depended on past military background.15 As 
aforementioned, the primary pitch of the PAP has always been the competence of its 
candidates. When military experience was brought up, it was in the context of 
organizational and operations management experience. Tan (2011) also noted that Lee 
Hsien Loong dropped the use of his military rank a few years before becoming prime 
minister, thereby suggesting that there was no added benefit in extolling his military 
background or that it might have even been deemed a liability.16 Consequently, this 
suggests that as much as security concerns are a perennial issue in Singapore, what 
remains at the forefront are the notions regarding talent and capability. 
Notwithstanding the above, it is evident that the “network” concept espoused by Israel’s 
Security Networks manifests in Singapore. As detailed in the transition process section, 
the movement from the military to the public sector and GLC/GLEs by non-AO military 
elites operates informally and is based on a network of active and retired military 
personnel. It is self-perpetuating as retired military elites introduce retiring military elites 
to organizations with vacancies – not to say that they discriminate against non-military 
personnel but given the many years they spent in the military, their networks naturally 
include many other active and former military personnel.  
Nevertheless, undergirding this is the military elites’ confidence, justified or otherwise, 
in the talent and capabilities of themselves and their peers. As BG Calvin commented, 
generals have “gone through a system that must have graded [them] … leadership in the 
SAF is direct; meaning you either make it or you don’t.” This can also explain why 
although the planned transition into the public sector only applied to a select group of 
military AOs, so many other retired military elites go through similar paths. It seems that 
the idea that SAF officers are very well-trained and adaptable to situations, and that they 
belong to a small group of talent, has been internalized by both the retired military elites 
and their civilian counterparts who hired them. ‘Interlocks’ – the intersection between 
organisations and individuals – occurred, and this allowed for the diffusion of norms and 
practices across firms and sectors (González-Bailon, Jennings, and Lodge 2013). A 
theoretical concept to explain this would be ‘ideational power’, which is defined as “the 
capacity of actors (whether individual or collective) to influence other actors’ normative 
and cognitive beliefs through the use of ideational elements. (Carstensen and Schmidt 
2016, p. 320)” There does not seem to be any official policy preferring retired military 
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elites, but people – at least the recruiters – are predisposed towards them. Summing up, 
in the public justification of the spread of the reach of military elites in Singapore, notions 
of talent and ability never escape the conversation.    
THE LESS ALTRUISTIC REASONS? 
The discussion of the ‘network’ effect leads on nicely to the issue of some Singaporeans 
having a nagging sense that post-retirement careers for military elites are rewards by the 
government to ensure ‘elite cohesion’ amongst those who are part of the ‘establishment’ 
or an expression of trust in the select few. Specifically, on the military elites, journalism 
professor Cherian George (2017, p. 99) wrote: “When scholar-officers leave the SAF at 
age fifty or younger, the government doesn’t require them to fend for themselves and thus 
get into mischief. They are transplanted into ministries and government-linked 
companies, keeping them safely within the family.”  
Long-time observer of Singapore’s political scene, Michael Barr, studied the elites in 
Singapore collectively – both civilian and military – and argued in The Ruling Elite of 
Singapore: Networks of Power and Influence (2014) that contemporary networks of 
power in Singapore were a deliberate project initiated and managed by Lee Kuan Yew, 
designed to empower himself and his family. He critiqued the notions of Singapore being 
run on the basis of meritocracy (talent) and multiracialism, that the institutionalization of 
modern methods of professional management in the matters of staff selection, assessment, 
and peer reviews was not replacing “traditional lines of patronage, privilege and 
consanguinity” but rather have been placed in the latter’s service (p. 115). Also, amongst 
the features that characterized the national elite was a military background, with the 
“Chinese scholar-officer corps [becoming] the ‘gold standard’ of the new elite in the 
1980s, routinely drawn into the civilian elite (pp. 81-82).” Those holding on to multiple 
executive and non-executive roles – and many retired military elites do – are “firm 
indications that [the] person is trusted by the ruling elite”, and the concentrated use of the 
same few people was due to the “personal character of the system of elite regeneration: a 
very small number of candidates are produced each year from an already small population 
pool, and then new personnel are trusted only if a personal trust has been developed with 
a highly placed patron, which usually means someone close to, if not a member of, the 
Lee family. This makes elite regeneration a highly restrictive process more directed at 
excluding people than including them. (p. 126)” 
In Barr’s mapping of the networks of power and influence, the inner circle consisted of 
political and administrative leaders in “key ministries, a few GLCs, the military” and the 
sovereign wealth funds, the mid-range circles consisting of a “wide range of government 
and government-linked institutions”, and the outer networks residing in institutions 
politically important “but not so central to the elite’s institutional base” (p. 107). Hence 
going by Barr’s thesis, the permeation of retired military elites in the public sector and 
government-linked entities is the embodiment of the power of this group of national elites, 
of which the centre of gravity, according to Barr, is currently PM Lee Hsien Loong 
(himself Lee Kuan Yew’s son) and his family.  
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Without access to the highest levels of the government, it is difficult to categorically 
affirm or disprove Barr’s thesis. However, to the extent that the interviewees have been 
candid in sharing their experiences, the network of power (if it exists) should be much 
smaller than what Barr has plotted. In the interviewees’ sharing of the transition process, 
the focus was always about what the organizations were looking for, and what the 
jobseekers could offer; they seemed to be at pains to highlight it as a meritocratic exercise. 
It also did not seem that the ‘centre’ of the network had direct influence in the hiring 
process, and neither was there any mention of post-retirement jobs being a ‘reward’ for 
loyalty rendered. They were couched in terms of opportunities to contribute and to be 
kept engaged intellectually. If anything, they seemed quite removed from PM Lee and his 
family. Perhaps, it is a case of what C. Wright Mills’ The Power Elite ([1956] 2000) had 
described: even though these individuals constitute a close-knit group, they are not part 
of a conspiracy that secretly manipulates events in their own selfish interest. Nonetheless, 
it is beyond this dissertation’s scope to offer a definitive ‘truth’; after all, the public 
service bargain that governs the relationship between the politicians and bureaucrats is 
often implicit and informal (Hood and Lodge 2006). Furthermore, without studying the 
ministries, statutory boards and GLC/GLEs on the whole and looking at their hiring of 
non-military elites, it would be inappropriate to conclude whether retired military elites 
are benefiting more than proportionately vis-à-vis ‘true’ civilians. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has highlighted that many Singaporean military elites continue their public 
service by other means after retiring; there is not only cross-sectional pattern but overall 
dynamic stability. Also, in contrast to standard civil-military relations theory, the SAF is 
not perceived to be distinct from the civilian public sector – it is but another conduit for 
talent development from which politicians and public sector leaders could be drawn. This 
can explain why so many retired military elites enter the public sector and GLC/GLEs. 
Historically, it is possible to identify a critical juncture that institutionalized the fusion of 
civilian and military leadership – when the SAF was in its infancy. Over the years, this 
phenomenon has self-perpetuated because of the ideational power of the view that talent 
was scarce and that the SAF had attracted many in this limited pool, making it only natural 
to continue ‘using’ them in the public sector. Even in the absence of ‘formal’ policy (like 
the planned transition for the AOs), it took on a life of its own in the wider public sector 
and GLC/GLEs. Some observers criticize this phenomenon as a patronage system at 
work, but this cannot be proven or dismissed categorically.  
What should one make of all these findings? Space constraints preclude a detailed 
comparison of Singapore vis-à-vis other countries, but a cursory survey suggests that the 
continuous nature (and justification) of the post-retirement career transition for 
Singapore’s military elite is unique. Israel, South Korea, and Taiwan are some countries 
commonly compared with Singapore – all are small countries in their region and face 
perceived continuous existential threats – and they all once had retired military elites 
playing dominant roles in society. As Israel transitioned to a market economy, Israeli 
retired military elites have penetrated an increasing number of civilian spheres (Barak 
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and Tsur 2012). South Korea and Taiwan have also seen the waning of active and retired 
military elites’ influence in the state and society (Choo 2016). The longevity of 
Singapore’s experience is thus quite an anomaly.  
The particularity of the Singaporean case can be partially explained by the continued rule 
of the PAP government, for in contrast to the democratization process in South Korea and 
Taiwan, there is no exogenous impetus to change things. But to the Singaporean retired 
military elites’ credit, there have indeed neither been any integrity-related scandals, nor 
have they been perceived to have pursued the SAF’s corporate interests from their 
positions. Moreover, in line with the government’s narrative regarding competency, and 
in rejection of Finer’s thesis that armed forces lack the technical abilities to run complex 
societies and economies, the military elites have been consciously developed to prepare 
them for their post-retirement careers. At least seventy-nine military elites, out of 170, 
possessed MBAs or postgraduate degrees in management or public administration 
(author’s own tabulation). Many were appointed board directors of statutory boards too. 
Without discussing whether these experiences are indeed effective or sufficient, it shows, 
at the very least, the government’s attempt at developing wider competencies and 
fulfilling its end of the bargain that the military elites are ‘valuable’. This would have 
played some role in gaining public acceptance of such a post-retirement transition. 
However, continued public acceptance of this phenomenon is not a given. As 
Singaporeans become more educated, education qualifications are no longer as awe-
inspiring. There have been growing criticisms of the phenomenon, ranging from concerns 
about groupthink to the lack of industry experience. It is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation to determine how valid these concerns are, or the assumptions that 
accompany the phenomenon for that matter. To some extent, ‘reality’ does not matter; 
what matters is how the situation is perceived (Masket 2018). For instance, it is perceived 
– rightly or wrongly – that a shipping carrier was mismanaged by a retired general, 
leading to it suffering losses. Yet, he was not seen to be penalised for his ‘failures’ but 
instead ‘given’ another job. Through all these, where continued widespread employment 
of retired military elites is coupled with perceived failures of their leadership, public 
acceptance of the practice would foreseeably drop. But more importantly, the 
government’s rhetoric of Singapore not being a society where “social pedigree and 
connections count for more than ability and effort” will seem to ring hollow(er) (Tharman 
2020). This perhaps is the greatest peril: when people no longer believe that they possess 
a fair chance in society and that opportunities are reserved for the gentry, fissures erupt 
in the social compact and social cohesion erodes. 
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NOTES  
 
1 2.6 percent of the list. 
2 The SAF was established in 1965 following independence and conscription was imple-
mented in 1967, where every able-bodied male citizen aged eighteen was eligible for call-
up. Except for calling-up females, Singapore’s initial model of conscription, career army, 
and reserve service was essentially adapted from the Israel Defense Forces. Israel had 
responded to Singapore’s appeal for help and sent Israeli soldiers train and guide the de-
velopment of SAF (Raska 2016).  
3 ‘Descent from heaven’. 
4 Chan and Ramaya were both career soldiers and Soh a psychologist in Mindef. 
5 See ‘“Outsiders Inside”: Experiences of Privately Contracted Educational Staff in the 
Singapore Armed Forces’ (Ho 2019) for an overview of PME in Singapore. 
6 Although Singapore had generals before 1990, the SAF only matured into its current 
state in the early 1990s, and the practice of early retirement only institutionalized then. 
7 Some are promoted to a ‘local’ rank when they take up certain appointments, such as 
the Defence Attaché to America, and among them some revert to the colonel rank upon 
relinquishing the appointment, having not been promoted to ‘full’ brigadier-general. One 
is known to have retired as a colonel and another possibly as a ‘local’ brigadier-general. 
8 Chan excluded those “with honorific titles and foreign officers on loan or hired on con-
tract to the early SAF”. This article continues this approach.  
9 A job is counted as ‘the first job post-retirement’ if that is the position the military elite 
holds in the year he retires – for a general who held the role in Organization X between 
2005-2015 and retired in 2010, he would be considered to have taken up his first post-
retirement job in Organization X in 2010. 
10 A scheme introduced in 1981, where SAF Overseas Scholarship (SAFOS) “scholars 
are given the opportunity, after their stint in MINDEF/SAF, to serve in the prestigious 
Administrative Service as well as in other Ministries (Mindef 2003).” SAFOS is the most 
prestigious undergraduate sponsorship awarded by the SAF, marketed as second in pres-
tige only to the President’s Scholarship. A 'government scholar' is a uniquely Singaporean 
term, attached to those sponsored by the government to pursue higher education and who 
are earmarked for leadership roles. This contrasts to elsewhere in the world, where ‘schol-
ars’ are those who pursue academic and intellectual pursuits. See da Cunha (1999, pp. 
466-467). 
11 This highly symbolic appearance of Singapore’s civilian leadership reviewing parades 
and official military functions in military uniform, and its impact on Singapore’s civil-
military relations seems not to have received academic attention thus far. 
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12 Retirement age for officers was between 50-55 years old before 1998, depending on 
rank (Singapore Armed Forces (Pensions) Regulations 2001); it was lowered to forty-five 
in 1998 as part of a ‘keep SAF young’ policy to engender dynamism and vibrance in the 
SAF (Mindef 1997). It was then raised to fifty years old in 2010. 
13 Various statutory boards. 
14 See Securitising Singapore: State Power and Global Threats Management (Aljunied 
2019) on the ‘militarization’ of society through the securitization of non-traditional secu-
rity challenges.  
15 Although holding the defense ministerial portfolio has been touted as one of the path-
ways to becoming the Prime Minister (Koh 2018). 
16 Lee turned fifty in 2002 and completed his National Service liabilities, and hence is 
‘fully’ civilian per se. Nonetheless, there is provision in Singapore to add ‘(Retired)’ be-
hind one’s military rank, but no political or public sector leader seems to use it – a plau-
sible reading to this is their desire to highlight their ‘civilian’ status.  
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APPENDIX: EXPLAINER OF THE FIVE SECTORS 
‘Private sector’ refers to companies that are owned and run totally privately, without any 
known links with the government. Some organisations, like the Singapore Business 
Advisors and Consultants Council, are also categorised here, because while they are 
ostensibly non-profit organisations, their primary objective is to ‘promote and advance 
the professionalism of business consulting’. Hence as long as an organisation has been 
deemed to be furthering the interests of the private sector, it has been assigned to this first 
category.  
‘Public sector’ refers to all government ministries, statutory boards, organisations found 
in the Singapore Government Directory17, and private limited companies set up as wholly 
owned subsidiaries of the preceding organisations. Statutory boards are a form of public 
agency established by an Act of Parliament and they provide public services and 
contribute directly to economic development. They are unique to the Singaporean 
context: they are autonomous and separate from the rest of Singapore’s Civil Service but 
are still policymaking entities in their own right. This differs from autonomous regulatory 
agencies in the West, which typically just implement rules and regulations developed by 
the policymakers and are uninvolved in policy formulation (Woo 2015). Universities and 
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other educational institutions are included in this ‘public sector’ category too, even 
though they might be classified as the ‘academic sector’ on its own elsewhere, because 
while they are autonomous, they are funded by the government and their contacts are 
indeed found in the government directory. As for private limited companies wholly 
owned by public organisations, an example is MSI Global Pte Ltd – a subsidiary of the 
Land Transport Authority that offers consultancy services on land transport management. 
Government-linked corporations, known as state-owned enterprises elsewhere, refer to 
firms founded by the government and corporatized over time. They are run by wage-
earning professional managers, independent from government subsidies, disciplined by 
the market and stay in business only if they are profitable (Chua 2016). These firms are 
managed, and their activities coordinated through Temasek Holdings, a holding company 
set up in 1974 that has the Minister for Finance as its sole shareholder. Temasek Holdings 
typically hold a controlling stake in them or possess a substantial number of shares. Based 
on 2008 to 2013 market capitalisation data, government-linked corporations accounted 
for thirty-seven percent of Singapore’s stock market value (Sim, Thomson and Yeong 
2014).  
Government-affiliated entities in this case include social enterprises owned by the 
National Trade Union Congress – a union federation that has a ‘symbiotic’ relationship 
with the ruling party and whose Secretary-General is a Minister without Portfolio in the 
Cabinet. Also included is the charitable foundation of the ruling party; although it is non-
profit, it is after all an offshoot of the ruling party and hence it is deemed more appropriate 
to categorise it as a government-affiliated entity. 
As aforementioned categories already include non-profit organisations, the last category 
has been named the ‘people sector’ to highlight the chief focus: the people in society. 
They are non-governmental organisations and include charitable organisations like the 
Red Cross Society, and sports organisations like the Football Association of Singapore. 
‘People Sector’ is a term used in Singapore by the government and statutory boards in 
conjunction with the ‘Private’ and ‘Public’ Sectors.18 
Annex 1: List of public sector organisations 
MOE 
Ministry of Education 
Academy of Principals Singapore  
National University of Singapore (NUS) 
Cancer Science Institute Singapore NUS 
Duke-NUS Graduate Medical School 
Energy Studies Institute NUS  
Institute of Systems Science NUS 
Yusof Ishak-ISEAS 
LKY School of Public Policy NUS 
Mechaobiology Institute NUS 
St. John’s Island National Marine Laboratory  
The Logistics Institute Asia-Pacific 
Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine NUS 
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Nanyang Technological University (NTU) 
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies 
Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies 
Lee Kong Chian School of Medicine NTU 
National Institute of Education 
Singapore Centre for Environmental Life Sciences Engineering NTU 
Singapore Centre for 3D Printing  
Temasek Polytechnic  
Singapore Polytechnic  
Republic Polytechnic 
Ngee Ann Polytechnic 
Nanyang Polytechnic 
Institute of Technical Education 
Lifelong Learning Council  
Singapore Examinations and Assessment Board 
Singapore Institute of Technology 
Singapore Management University 
SkillsFuture Singapore 
St Stephen's School  
Temasek Laboratories @Singapore University of Technology and Design 
Lee Kuan Yew Centre for Innovation Cities 
MTI 
Ministry of Trade and Industry 
A*STAR 
Accelerate Technologies Pte Ltd (A*ccelerate) 
Biomedical Research Council A*STAR 
Biomedical Sciences Institute A*STAR 
CommonTown Pte Ltd  
Institute for Infocomm Research (I2R) A*STAR 
Singapore Bioimaging Consortium 
Design Singapore Council 
EDB 
Energy Market Authority 
Enterprise Singapore 
SPRING Singapore 
Trade Development Board/IE Singapore 
Sentosa Development Corporation 
Singapore Tourism Board 
MINDEF 
Ministry of Defence 
Advisory Council on Community Relations in Defence (ACCORD) Main 
Council  
ACCORD Council for Family & Community Engagement 
Defence Management Group Enhanced Agencies Supervisory Board 
Defence Science and Technology Agency 
Cap Vista Pte Ltd 
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Defence Cyber Organisation 
DSO National Laboratories 
Defence Medical Research Institute Mindef/  
Defence Medical Research Institute DSTA/  
Defence Medical and Environmental Research Institute DSO National 
Laboratories  
External Review Panel on SAF Safety 
Safety and Systems Review Directorate Mindef 
SAF-NTU Academy 
Security and Intelligence Division 
Singapore Discovery Centre Pte Ltd  
Temasek Defence Systems Institute NUS 
MOH 
Ministry of Health 
Agency for Integrated Care 
Pioneer Generation Office 
Health Promotion Board 
MOH Holdings Pte Ltd/ Health Corporation of Singapore 
Eastern Health Alliance Pte Ltd 
Integrated Health Information Systems Pte Ltd  
National Healthcare Group Pte Ltd 
National Medical Research Council 
National University Health System (NUHS)  
National University Hospital 
Sengkang General Hospital 
Sengkang Health 
Singapore General Hospital 
SingHealth 
Tan Tock Seng Hospital  
MEWR 
Ministry of Environment and Water Resources 
Agri-Food and Veterinary Authority/ Singapore Food Agency 
National Environment Agency 
NParks 
Gardens by the Bay Company Ltd 
Public Utilities Board 
Pub Consultants Pte Ltd 
Public Utilities Board (PUB)’s Risk Management Committee 
MND 
Ministry of National Development 
Building and Construction Authority 
Housing and Development Board 
Urban Redevelopment Authority 
MOM 
Ministry of Manpower 
Central Provident Fund  
Workforce Development Agency/ Workforce Singapore  
Workplace Safety and Health Council 
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MSF 
Ministry of Social and Family Development 
Early Childhood Development Agency 
PMO 
Prime Minister’s Office 
Civil Service Institute/ Civil Service College 
Government Technology Agency 
National Research Foundation 
Public Service Division 
Singapore Chinese Cultural Centre 
MOT 
Ministry of Transport 
Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore 
Land Transport Authority 
MSI Global Pte Ltd 
Ezlink Pte Ltd 
Maritime and Port Authority 
Mass Rapid Transit Corporation 
Singapore MRT Ltd 
Port of Singapore Authority 
National Maritime Safety at Sea Council 
Singapore Land Authority 
MCCY 
Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth 
Charity Council 
Esplanade Co. Ltd 
Families for Life Council  
National Arts Council 
National Council of Social Service 
National Integration Council  
National Museum of Singapore   
National Volunteer and Philanthropy Centre 
National Youth Achievement Award 
People's Association 
Singapore Sports Council/Sport Singapore 
Youth Olympic Games Organising Committee 
MCI 
Ministry of Information and the Arts/ Ministry of Information, 
Communications and the Arts/ Ministry of Communications and 
Information 
Cyber Security Agency 
Singapore Broadcasting Authority/ Media Development Authority  
Infocomm Development Authority/Infocomm Media Development 
Authority  
National Infocomm Security Committee 
National Cybersecurity R&D Executive Committee 
National Library Board 
National Archives of Singapore 
MHA Ministry of Home Affairs 
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Home Team Academy MHA 
National Crime Prevention Council 
MINLAW 
Ministry of Law 
Intellectual Property Office of Singapore 
IP Academy 
MOF 
Ministry of Finance 
MAS Cyber Security Advisory Panel 
Singapore Totalisator Board 
Singapore Pools (Private) Limited 
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
 
17 See https://www.sgdi.gov.sg/. 
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